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The Future of Innovation 
TRADE SECRETS, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND 
PROTECTIONISM—AN AGE-OLD TALE* 
Innovation makes enemies of all those who prospered under the old 
regime, and only lukewarm support is forthcoming from those who 
would prosper under the new. Their support is indifferent partly 
from fear and partly because they are generally incredulous, never 
really trusting new things unless they have tested them by 
experience.1 
INTRODUCTION 
The forces that Machiavelli described over half a 
millennium ago continue to shape our world of innovation 
today.2 Through recent common-law and statutory 
developments favoring industry, the power of the old is holding 
back the development of the new. Although the Constitution 
gives the federal government the power to control these forces 
for the betterment of society,3 the current trade secret 
framework concentrates too much power in the hands of 
industry, threatening innovation by allowing industrialists to 
“steer evolution as it benefits them.”4  
  
 * © 2005 Michael P. Simpson. All Rights Reserved. 
 1 NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 17 (W.W. Norton 2d ed. 1992) (1515). 
 2 See id. 
 3 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Constitution gives Congress the power 
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries[.]” Id. The Supreme Court has repeatedly articulated that the policy goals 
surrounding both copyright and patent law are to benefit society, not industry. See, 
e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The 
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative 
labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the 
general public good.”); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (“The sole 
interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in 
the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.”). 
 4 LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 264 (2001) (“That power is not 
within our tradition. It is not what has built the America we admire.”). 
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This Note argues that developments in the area of trade 
secret law have swung the pendulum too far in the direction of 
industry. By rooting trade secret law in an intellectual property 
based rationale, both the common law and recent 
Congressional enactments have expanded trade secret law well 
beyond its original parameters. This expansion is unfortunate, 
both from a theoretical and practical vantage point: aside from 
drawing false analogies to patent and copyright law, this new 
regime is causing society to suffer by unduly constricting the 
spread of useful and innovative ideas. Instead, this Note 
contends that the pendulum must swing back in the favor of 
society in order for trade secret law to serve the 
constitutionally mandated policy goals that intellectual 
property laws purport to serve.5 To achieve this objective, this 
Note proposes two solutions that may help to equilibrate 
industry’s interests with those of society. 
This Note proceeds as follows: Part I summarizes the 
current law of trade secrets. Part II illustrates how the 
pendulum has swung too far in the favor of industry, with Part 
II.A outlining the Supreme Court’s adoption of a traditional 
intellectual property rationale and Part II.B explaining the 
reasoning and legislative history behind the Economic 
Espionage Act (EEA), a statute that imposes criminal sanctions 
for the theft of trade secrets. Part III illustrates some of the 
major deficiencies in the law, both theoretical and practical, 
and utilizes practical examples to demonstrate the problems in 
the current trade secret framework that have been exacerbated 
by the EEA. Finally, Part IV proposes two solutions to help 
swing the pendulum back towards the constitutionally 
mandated policy goal of benefiting society. 
I. TRADE SECRETS: BACKGROUND  
A. Fundamentals of Trade Secret Law 
The central purpose of trade secret law is to protect 
secret and commercially valuable information from being 
misappropriated. Just about everyone has heard of the famous 
formula for Coca-Cola,6 or the eleven secret “herbs and spices” 
  
 5 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also supra text accompanying note 3. 
 6 See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Shreveport, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 
288, 289 (D.C. Del. 1985). 
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that make KFC’s chicken so tasty.7 Trade secret law protects 
important formulas like these as well as other commercially 
valuable information.  
Although trade secret doctrines vary throughout 
jurisdictions, there is a general consensus that to establish 
liability for trade secret misappropriation, a plaintiff must 
show that the information at issue is a “trade secret” 8 and that 
the defendant acquired, used, or disclosed the information in 
breach of confidence or by other improper means.9  
There are three basic requirements for something to 
qualify as a trade secret: the object at issue must be 
“information”;10 that information must confer a competitive 
value because it is secret;11 and that information must be 
maintained under reasonable safeguards in order to assure 
secrecy.12 The “information” requirement is extremely broad in 
scope. In contrast to other traditional intellectual property 
fields, such as copyrights and patents, trade secrets can protect 
technical and non-technical information, expression or ideas, 
and even facts. Its protective cloak has been extended to cover 
such things as financial information, methods of doing 
business, customer lists, supplier lists, future marketing 
tactics, sales and product plans, employee names, and even 
phone numbers.13  
The requirement that “the information be of economic 
value because it is secret” merely requires that the information 
confer a potential economic advantage to the holder over 
competitors. Almost anything can qualify provided that it helps 
  
 7 See Gina White, Note, Intellectual Property—Trade Secret Law— Is the 
Arkansas Supreme Court Following Other Jurisdictions Down the Wrong Road in 
Analyzing Combination Trade Secrets?, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 407, 407 n.2 
(citing About KFC, Original Recipe Is Still a Secret, at http://www.kfc.com/about/ 
secret.html (last visited April 20, 2005)). 
 8 Forty-two states and the District of Columbia have adopted the Uniform 
Trade Secret Act’s (UTSA) definition of a trade secret. Although New York and a few 
others have not, the common-law is very similar to the nuts and bolts of trade secret 
law. See C. Rachal Pugh, Nondisclosure Agreement Protected Confidential Information 
Which Did Not Qualify for Trade Secret Protection, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 231, 235 
(2002). 
 9 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985). 
 10 See id. at § 1(4). This is a rather broad requirement and one of the major 
benefits of trade secret law as opposed to copyright, which only protects expressions, 
not ideas, and patents, which require novelty. 
 11 See 1 ROGER M. MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.02 (1998). 
 12 Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of 
Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 248 (citing MILGRIM, supra note 11, §§ 1.03-1.04). 
 13 Id. (citing 1 MILGRIM, supra note 11, § 1.09). 
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to create commercial value.14 In fact, that information does not 
even need to be in use to be protected. The Restatement (Third) 
of Unfair Competition15 (“Restatement Third”) protects trade 
secrets that can potentially be used.16 This means that it does 
not require actual and continuous “use” by the creator to 
qualify as a trade secret—for instance, results of research that 
are not used directly in one’s business may qualify as trade 
secrets under this definition.  
“Secrecy” has been defined by courts as any information 
that is not known or easily ascertainable through proper means 
by a firm’s competitors. “Proper means” commonly include 
things such as reverse engineering (obtaining a finished 
product and taking it apart in an attempt to discover its secret 
of operation) or independent discovery through factual 
knowledge already in the public domain. 
The final requirement to qualify as a trade secret—
reasonable precautions to maintain the secrecy—is adjudged 
according to an objective “reasonableness” standard. Although 
a trade secret holder need not take all possible precautions to 
satisfy this standard, many companies go to great lengths to 
assure this element is met so that the adequacy of their 
measures will not be second-guessed in court. To protect their 
interests, companies may take various steps, such as: 
disclosing the secret only under a confidentiality agreement 
and on a need-to-know basis, constructing fences or walls to 
block the public’s view, instituting a system of building 
security, using passwords, requiring entry and exit interviews 
of employees, and restricting employee access to sensitive 
areas.17  
Once something qualifies as a trade secret, a 
defendant’s liability turns on whether the defendant acquired, 
used, or disclosed the information by improper means.18 
  
 14 See 1 MILGRIM, supra note 11, § 1.09 (listing several different categories 
that have been protected). 
 15 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 39-45 (1995). 
 16 See Patricia A. Meier, Note, Looking Back and Forth: The Restatement 
(Third) of Unfair Competition and Potential Impact on the Texas Trade Secret Law, 4 
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 415, 455 (1995-1996). 
 17 See Bone, supra note 12, at 249; Vincent Chiappetta, Myth, Chameleon or 
Intellectual Property Olympian?  A Normative Framework Supporting Trade Secret 
Law, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV 69, 77 (1999). 
 18 Improper means may include: breach of contract, violation of a confidential 
relationship, bribery, theft, misrepresentation , and other wrongs. See Kewanee Oil Co. 
v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475-76 (1974); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1) (1985). 
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“Improper” has been defined by the Restatement Third to 
include “theft, fraud, unauthorized interception of 
communications, inducement of or knowing participation in a 
breach of confidence, and other means either wrongful in 
themselves or wrongful under the circumstances of the case.”19 
There is, however, much room for judicial discretion here, 
especially when the conduct seems unethical.20 Yet a proper 
acquisition, such as independent creation, reverse engineering, 
or acquisition from a public source, is always an absolute 
defense.21  
Even once all of these elements are established, the 
owner generally does not receive a monopoly in the idea or 
process that encompasses the secret; instead, trade secret law 
only protects the secret from being discovered improperly.22 If 
the plaintiff can establish liability, the court usually issues an 
injunction and follows with a monetary award of provable 
damages.23  
The civil law of trade secrets has been codified under a 
number of different uniformed schemes—most recently, the 
Restatement Third,24 and Uniform Trade Secret Act (UTSA).25 
An owner of a trade secret can also pursue federal criminal 
sanctions against a person who misappropriates his/her secret 
ideas.  
  
 19 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 43 (1985). 
 20 See E.I. duPont deNemours Powder Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 
1017 (5th Cir. 1970) (“Improper will always be a word of many nuances, determined by 
time, place, and circumstances. We therefore need not proclaim a catalogue of 
commercial improprieties.”). 
 21 These exceptions are not explicitly listed in the UTSA; however, courts 
have found them to be implied under the element of secrecy. See Chiappetta, supra 
note 17, at 78 n.53. 
 22 However, it is the contention of this Note that in certain circumstances 
trade secret owners are in fact granted a de facto monopoly. This situation occurs most 
often when an invention is difficult to reverse engineer, such as an innovation 
involving chemical compounds. See infra  Part III.B. 
 23 See Chiappetta, supra note 17, at 79. It is important to take note that this 
is merely a general overview of trade secret law, meant only to provide the necessary 
background information for the discussion that is to follow. Trade secret law can be a 
highly nuanced and varying form of law from state to state, so it is important for a 
practitioner to perform an intensive search through jurisdictional case law where the 
litigation is to take place. See MILGRIM, supra note 11, §1.01. 
 24 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 39-45 (1995). 
 25 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1) (1985). 
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B. The Economic Espionage Act of 1996: Federal Criminal 
Sanctions for Trade Secret Theft 
In addition to civil liability, the EEA created federal 
criminal liability for anyone caught stealing a trade secret.26 
While trade secret law was developing on the civil side, it was 
argued that a large gap was forming in the effectiveness of 
criminal laws protecting the investment of industry in research 
and development.27 As the technological age arrived, industrial 
espionage, also referred to as “economic espionage,” was 
reportedly on the rise. Although industrial espionage and the 
stealing of trade secrets had transpired for hundreds of years,28 
it was argued that the stakes had never been so high29 and the 
means never so elaborate.30 In response, Congress passed the 
EEA.31 
Liability under section 1831, entitled Economic 
Espionage, requires that the theft of trade secrets “benefit a[] 
foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent . . 
. .”32 The term “misappropriation of trade secrets” covers (1) 
outright theft,33 (2) unauthorized duplication,34 (3) trafficking in 
  
 26 Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2000). 
 27 James H.A. Pooley et al., Understanding the Economic Espionage Act of 
1996, 5 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 177, 178 (1997). 
 28 See JACQUES BERGIER, SECRET ARMIES: THE GROWTH OF CORPORATE AND 
INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE 3 (Harold J. Salemson trans., 1969) (telling the popular account 
of the Chinese princess that hid silk worms in her hat 1,500 years ago, thus supplying 
the secret of silk manufacture to India). 
 29 See Robert C. Van Arnam, Comment, Business War: Economic Espionage 
in the United States and the European Union and the Need for Greater Trade Secret 
Protection, 27 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 95, 97–98 nn.26-28 (2001). The estimated 
loss by the top U.S. companies due to industrial espionage by foreign nations was 
estimated to be $45 billion in 2001. The number of jobs lost to industrial spying was 
estimated at 6 million. The incidents usually take place between the economically 
competitive nations, such as, China, the United States and the member nations of the 
European Union. Id. 
 30 Id. at 99 (“[T]he French intelligence agency recently disclosed that it had 
bugged hotel rooms and the first-class cabins of Air France jets and substituted spies 
for flight attendants to eavesdrop on visiting foreign executives.”). 
 31 Economic Espionage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 101(a), 110 Stat. 3488-3490 
(1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2000)). 
 32 Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a) (2000). 
 33 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a)(1) (2000) (“[S]teals, or without authorization 
appropriates, takes, carries away, or conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains 
a trade secret . . . .”). 
 34 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a)(2) (2000) (“[W]ithout authorization copies, duplicates, 
sketches, draws, photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies, 
replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys a trade 
secret[.]”). 
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stolen trade secrets,35 (4) attempted theft, duplication, or 
trafficking,36 and (5) conspiracy to commit any theft, 
duplication, or trafficking.37 The EEA also imposes a scienter 
requirement.38 
Section 1832, entitled Theft of Trade Secrets, is aimed 
at domestic thieves.39 It is essentially the same as section 1831, 
but includes three additional elements: (1) the intended benefit 
realized must be economic in nature;40 (2) the thief must intend 
or know that the offense will injure the rightful owner;41 and (3) 
the stolen information must be “related to or included in a 
product produced for or placed in interstate or foreign 
commerce.”42 
Because one of the major motivating forces behind the 
passage of the EEA was foreign acts of industrial espionage,43 
penalties are commensurately harsher for someone who 
intentionally or knowingly stole a trade secret to “benefit any 
foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent.”44 
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF TRADE SECRET LAW: AN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RATIONALE  
The current state of trade secret law, as represented by 
the seminal U.S. Supreme Court decisions of Kewanee Oil Co. 
v. Bicron Corp.45 and Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,46 and 
embodied in the Restatement Third, is a framework that draws 
  
 35 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a)(3) (2000) (“[R]eceives, buys, or possesses a trade secret, 
knowing the same to have been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without 
authorization . . . .”). 
 36 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a)(4) (2000) (“[A]ttempts to commit any offense described 
in any of paragraphs (1) through (3) . . . .”). 
 37 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a)(5) (2000) (“[C]onspires with one or more other persons 
to commit any offense described in any of paragraphs (1) through (3), and one or more 
of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy . . . .”). 
 38 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a) (2000). 
 39 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2000). 
 40 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2000) (noting defendant must intend to convert trade 
secret to economic benefit of someone other than owner). 
 41 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (2000) (indicating defendant must intend or know 
threat will injure owner of trade secret). 
 42 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (2000). 
 43 See 142 CONG. REC. S 12,211-12 (1996) (discussing the failure of the 
current law to ensure the safety of corporations’ valuable research and development 
from foreign acts of industrial espionage); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 6 (1996). 
 44 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2000). 
 45 416 U.S. 470 (1974).  
 46 467 U.S. 986 (1984). 
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from property rights47 rationale akin to that supporting 
copyright and patent law. Although this modern construct is 
vastly different than the early common law’s Lockean 
conception of trade secret law, this evolution did not take place 
overnight. The process was incremental—trade secret law’s 
original foundation was slowly whittled away and eventually 
replaced by economic policy goals commonly articulated for 
traditional forms of intellectual property, i.e., copyright and 
patent law. 
A. The Current State of Trade Secret Law: From Kewanee 
to Monsanto—the Move to a Property Rights Framework 
and a Traditional Intellectual Property Rationale  
Kewanee and Monsanto are seminal decisions in trade 
secret jurisprudence that represent the law’s current rooting in 
an intellectual property rights regime. 
In Kewanee, the Court had to decide whether Ohio’s 
trade secret laws were void under the Supremacy Clause 
because they stood as an obstacle to the execution of the 
purposes and objectives of federal patent laws.48 The petitioner, 
Harshaw Chemical Co. (Harshaw), developed certain processes 
that aided in the growth of a 17-inch synthetic crystal that was 
useful in the detection of ionizing radiation. The respondents 
were former employees of Harshaw who had signed agreements 
not to disclose trade secrets obtained as employees. They left 
Harshaw and joined the newly created Bicron Corp. (Bicron), a 
competitor. Soon after, Bicron also grew a 17-inch crystal. 
Harshaw brought a diversity action seeking injunctive relief 
and damages for misappropriation of trade secrets.49 The 
District Court, applying Ohio trade secret law, granted a 
permanent injunction.50 The Court of Appeals reversed on the 
ground that Ohio’s trade secret law conflicted with federal 
  
 47 The term “property right” is generally used to describe a package of 
distinct entitlements granted to an individual, sometimes referred to as a “bundle of 
rights.” Property involves legal relationships “among people regarding control and 
disposition of valued resources.” JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 
2 (2001). When someone is said to have a “property right” in something, the legal 
implications and consequences can be quite different than if their interest were 
protected by contract or tort law. This distinction will be explored in greater detail 
throughout this Note. 
 48 Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 470. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
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patent laws.51 Since Ohio used the same trade secret definition 
adopted by the Restatement (First) of Torts and used by a 
majority of states at the time, the Supreme Court essentially 
held the fate of trade secret law in its grasp.  
Holding that Ohio’s trade secret law was not preempted 
by the federal patent law, the Court articulated a rationale for 
trade secret law that was synonymous with patent and 
copyright law. Although it stated two policy goals—“[t]he 
maintenance of standards of commercial ethics and the 
encouragement of invention”52—the incentive-based policy 
argument of encouraging innovation won the day.53 The Court 
in Kewanee adopted a policy rationale for trade secrets 
analogous to the economic rationale that supported limited 
monopolies in copyrights and patents.54 Essentially, trade 
secrets were believed to enhance the incentive to create, 
thereby benefiting society.  
Following Kewanee, the Court in Monsanto.55 further 
affirmed that trade secret law was now being viewed as a form 
of intellectual property. In Monsanto, an applicant for 
registration of a pesticide brought suit to avoid the data-
disclosure requirement created by the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1972 (FIFRA).56 Monsanto 
sought injunctive and declaratory relief alleging that FIFRA 
effected a “taking” of property without just compensation in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment.57 The trial court declared the 
challenged provisions of the act unconstitutional and 
permanently enjoined the EPA from implementing or enforcing 
it.58 The Supreme Court, in reviewing the trial court’s decision, 
did not hold FIFRA unconstitutional, but did hold that 
Monsanto’s trade secret right was a “property right protected 
by the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”59  
  
 51 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. et al., 478 F.2d 1074, 1086 (6th Cir. 1972). 
 52 Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 481. 
 53 See Bone, supra note 12, at 262 (citing Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 482, 484; 
American Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 329 (7th Cir. 1984); RICHARD POSNER, 
ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 244 (1981); Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case for a Federal 
Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 427, 435-42 (1995)).  
 54 See 416 U.S. at 481 (stating that one of the broadly stated policies behind 
protecting secret information was to motivate creation). 
 55 467 U.S. 986 (1984). 
 56 Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 973 (1972). 
 57 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 986 (1984). 
 58 Monsanto Co. v. Acting Adm’r, U.S. EPA, 564 F. Supp. 552 (E.D. Mo. 
1983). 
 59 Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1003-04. 
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The Court found many justifications for granting 
Monsanto a property right in its secret formula. First, the 
Court utilized the Lockean concept of natural rights to support 
its contention. Citing FIFRA’s legislative history, the Court 
pointed to the fact that Congress recognized that data 
developers had a “proprietary interest”60 in their data and that 
they were “‘entitled’ to ‘compensation’ because they ‘have legal 
ownership of the data.’”61 The Court argued that this 
“perception of trade secrets as property is consonant with a 
notion of ‘property’ that extends beyond land and tangible 
goods and includes the products of an individual’s ‘labour and 
invention.’”62 Essentially, the Court was arguing that Congress 
intended the information to be protected as property as a 
reward for hard work. The Court utilized the Lockean concept 
that labor created rights in “property” to strengthen its 
argument that trade secret holders should have property 
rights. 
In addition, the Court reasoned that trade secrets had 
characteristics synonymous with tangible forms of property. As 
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, explained: “A trade 
secret is assignable. A trade secret can form the res of a trust, 
and it passes to a trustee in bankruptcy.”63 Thus, he concluded 
that “[t]rade secrets have many of the characteristics of more 
tangible forms of property.”64 As a result, the Court held that 
Monsanto had a property right that was protected by the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.65 
The Court’s broad definition of property rights in trade 
secrets protected industry in several respects, most notably in 
avoiding making disclosures to regulatory agencies when the 
product of that disclosure was deemed a trade secret. Most 
recently, in Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly,66 cigarette 
manufacturers claimed that the Massachusetts Disclosure Act 
(MDA),67 which required them to disclose their ingredient lists 
to the state, constituted an unconstitutional taking of their 
property. Citing Monsanto, the cigarette manufacturers 
  
 60 Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 95-334, at 32 (1977)). 
 61 Id. (quoting H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1560, at 29 (1978)). 
 62 Id. at 1003. 
 63 Id. at 1002. 
 64 Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1002. 
 65 Id. at 1003-04 
 66 312 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 67 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94, § 307B (2002). 
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contended that their ingredient lists were trade secrets and 
hence property protected by the Takings Clause. They argued 
that mandatory public disclosure of those trade secrets 
essentially destroyed their value, thereby effecting a taking. 
The First Circuit agreed, reiterating the property concept set 
forth in Monsanto repeatedly throughout the decision. The 
court reasoned that “[s]pecific laws simply cannot destroy 
property interests.”68 It was clear to the court “that the tobacco 
companies ha[d] a property interest in their trade secrets”69 and, 
since the MDA transformed their “private property into public 
property without compensation . . .[,]”70 it was a clear taking 
under the Fifth Amendment.  
Beyond these judicial decisions, the Restatement Third 
codifies trade secret law’s relatively recent shift to a property 
regime. It recognizes that trade secret law has adopted the 
policy goals for copyright and patent law, explaining that trade 
secret protection is justified “as a means to encourage 
investment in research by providing an opportunity to capture 
the returns from successful innovations.”71 
This incentive-based argument reasons that protecting 
knowledge and ideas encourages the creation of more such 
innovations, thereby benefiting society as a whole.72 Since 
knowledge and ideas are intangible objects that are both non-
rivalrous (i.e., one person’s consumption does not reduce the 
availability of the good to others), and non-excludible (i.e., it is 
difficult to exclude others from enjoying their benefits), 
reproduction of an idea is potentially limitless. However, 
researching and developing new ideas is very expensive. Hence, 
economic scholars argue that protection is necessary to prevent 
people from free-riding off of others’ valuable investment of 
time and money. This incentive-based argument has supported 
copyright73 and patent law74 for quite some time and is the 
principal rationale supporting trade secrets today.75 
  
 68 Phillip Morris, 312 F.3d at 32 (emphasis added). 
 69 Id. at 32-33 (emphasis added). 
 70 Id. at 32 (emphasis added) (citing Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. 
Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980)). 
 71 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. a (1995). 
 72 See Bone, supra note 12, at 262 (citing ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 112-16, 135-49 (1988)). 
 73 See generally William M. Landes & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis 
of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEG. STUD. 325-63 (1989) (applying the rationale to copyright 
law). 
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By importing the policy rationale from patent and 
copyright law, trade secret law implicitly adopts their 
restrictions as well. That is to say, if the law of trade secrets 
were to restrict innovation it would contradict its own policy 
goals and frustrate the goals of patent law as well. It would 
further be a violation of the Supremacy Clause. The 
Constitution gives Congress the power to “promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries[.]”76 The Supreme Court 
has repeatedly articulated that the purpose and objective of 
federal patent law is to benefit society by stimulating and 
encouraging innovation. As far back as 1832, in Grant v. 
Raymond,77 the Court explicitly stated this policy goal: 
[I]t cannot be doubted that the settled purpose of the United States 
has ever been, and continues to be, to confer on the authors of useful 
inventions an exclusive right in their inventions for the time 
mentioned in their patent. It is the reward stipulated for the 
advantages derived by the public for the exertions of the individual, 
and is intended as a stimulus to those exertions.78 
Inventors are given patents, or property rights, in their 
inventions as a reward “for the advantages derived by the 
public,”79 and to stimulate more inventions for the public good. 
If trade secret law frustrated this purpose it would be void 
under the Supremacy Clause. The Court’s seminal decision in 
Kewanee held that Ohio’s trade secret law did not frustrate this 
purpose. In doing so, however, it moved trade secret law 
towards the intellectual property regime. Next, Monsanto 
protected trade secrets as property under the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause. The Restatement Third 
reinforces the fact that trade secrets are now characterized as a 
  
 74 See generally Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent 
Law, 23 J. LEG. STUD. 247 (1994) (applying the rationale to patent law)). 
 75 See Bone, supra note 12, at 262 (citing Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 482, 484; 
American Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 328 (7th Cir. 1984)); RICHARD 
POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 244 (1981); Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case for a 
Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 427, 435-42 (1995)).  
 76 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 77 31 U.S. 218 (1832). 
 78 Id. at 241-42. 
 79 Id. 
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form of intellectual property with liability centered on a 
violation of the owner’s “property right.”80  
These most recent codifications further demonstrate 
that this new direction has shifted the law to the benefit of 
industry. In several respects, the Restatement Third has 
expanded trade secret protection beyond the safeguards 
originally developed in the Restatement (First) of Torts. First, 
the actual and continuous “use” requirement in the 
Restatement (First) of Torts81 has been expanded to include 
“potential use,” protecting the results of research that are not 
directly used by the business.82 Second, it defines the 
misappropriation element more broadly than in previous 
formulations of the law. No longer is use or disclosure of the 
trade secret required for liability; merely acquiring the trade 
secret “improperly” is enough to establish liability.83 This 
expansion has proven to be particularly valuable for industries 
characterized by rapid and often ephemeral technological 
developments, such as computers, software, biotechnology, and 
pharmaceuticals.84  
But this is not the whole story. As the law expanded on 
the civil side, and the conceptualization of trade secrets shifted 
towards that of traditional forms of intellectual property, 
Congress passed the EEA, a law that greatly increased the 
safeguards afforded to industry. 
B. The Economic Espionage Act of 1996: A Tool of Industry 
As the common law offered greater protection to 
industry, Congress further bolstered these protections by 
enacting the EEA. This recent evolution in the law of trade 
secrets has supplied owners with a very powerful weapon to 
guard their intangible interests. The passing of the EEA helped 
  
 80 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. b (This “property 
rationale emphasizes the nature of the appropriated information, especially its value 
and secrecy.” ). Furthermore, “[c]ommentators have argued that the [UTSA], in force in 
42 states, adopts a view of trade secrets as property.” Mark A. Lemley, Property, 
Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1042 n.45 (2005) (citing 
Lynn C. Tyler, Trade Secrets in Indiana: Property vs. Relationship, 31 IND. L. REV. 339, 
339 (1998)). 
 81 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (1939). 
 82 See Meier, supra note 16, at 455.  
 83 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40, cmt. b (1995). 
 84 Meier, supra note 16, at 454-55 (citing Holly Emrick Svetz, Note, Japan’s 
New Trade Secret Law: We Asked for It—Now What Have We Got?, 26 GEO. WASH. J. 
INT’L L. & ECON. 413, 414 (1992)). 
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change trade secrets from what was once thought of as a 
supplemental system, catching ideas and inventions that fell 
through the grasps of patent law, into a system grounded in 
property rights that constricts the flow of ideas through 
criminal sanctions. It has effectively swung the pendulum 
directly towards the interests of industry. 
Despite its lofty goals, the EEA is a bill that was clearly 
sponsored by, and passed to benefit, big business. In the early 
1990s, big business created an uproar over the large amounts 
of money lost due to industrial espionage. A representative, 
speaking on behalf of the bill, articulated these concerns, 
stating that “American companies have faced the fact, 
unfortunately, that our laws were written so long ago that they 
do not deal with the protection of ideas in the way that they 
should . . . .”85 This view was bolstered by the reported rise in 
trade secret thefts by other countries. 
The effect of these crimes, it was believed, endangered 
the country’s economic prosperity.86 Making matters worse, 
Congress felt the existing system was inadequate to curtail 
these economic losses. Prior to the EEA’s passage, federal 
prosecutors had no right to pursue someone under a theft of 
trade secret action, and state schemes were far more restrictive 
than the broad new act because most state civil schemes 
required the violator to acquire the trade secret through 
“improper means.”87 
Sharp increases in cybercrime (crimes where computers 
play an intricate role) also presented analytical difficulties.88 
The earlier statutes that prosecutors had at their disposal (i.e., 
wire fraud, mail fraud, and trespass) were said to be 
inadequate to provide protection.89 It was difficult for 
  
 85 142 CONG. REC. H 12137-01 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996) (statement of Rep. 
Lofgren). 
 86 See Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Problematic Role of Criminal Law in 
Regulating Use of Information: The Case of the Economic Espionage Act, 80 N.C. L. 
REV. 853, 864 n.49 (2002). Moohr states that upon signing H.R. 3723 President William 
J. Clinton confirmed “that the ultimate purpose of the EEA is to safeguard the nation’s 
security and economic strength by protecting the intellectual capital of American 
businesses.” Id. 
 87 See Aaron Burstein, A Survey of Cybercrime in the United States, 18 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 313, 326 (2003). 
 88 See id. at 315. (“Computer-based activities simply began to fall outside the 
act or mens rea requirements (or both) of mail and wire fraud, theft, and trespass. The 
result was ‘an unsatisfying, result-oriented jurisprudence.’”). 
 89 This is exemplified by the decision in United States v. Brown, 925 F.2d 
1301 (10th Cir 1991).  
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prosecutors to pursue criminal liability under the then-current 
law because they needed to “prove that the defendant’s actions 
deprived the owner of its property,”90 which proved quite 
challenging. For example, in the United States v. Seidlitz91 a 
former military contractor stole a password to download 
valuable software from his former employer. The Fourth 
Circuit quickly concluded that the software was property.92 Yet 
Seidlitz merely copied the software, so his conduct did not 
actually deprive the employer of its copy of the software. As the 
federal wire fraud statute required a deprivation of another’s 
property, it was unclear how Seidlitz’s conduct could qualify as 
such.93 Faced with these difficulties, “courts tended to reach 
results-oriented outcomes.” 94 
Against this backdrop, the EEA breezed through 
Congress,95 providing harsh penalties for those caught stealing 
trade secrets. By providing criminal relief, Congress helped 
move the basis for trade secret misappropriation liability 
deeper into the realm of property than ever before. In contrast 
to existing laws, the EEA liability scheme was steeped in a 
property rights approach. Simply proving that the defendant 
obtained the information through means that were 
unauthorized by the owner was enough.96  
Because the actus reus and mens rea elements are much 
easier to meet under the EEA than other statutes, such as the 
Copyrights Act,97 prosecutors are more likely to use the EEA in 
many cases where the defendant’s alleged actions result in 
numerous overlapping federal charges. For example, under the 
  
[D]efendant John Brown escaped prosecution under the National Stolen 
Property Act (NSPA) because Brown’s former employer had shipped the 
alleged trade secrets, a computer program and software manuals from a 
former employer, to Brown on backup tapes that Brown himself owned. The 
Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the case, holding that the NSPA “applies 
only to physical ‘goods, wares or merchandise’ that were themselves ‘stolen, 
converted or taken by fraud.’”  
Burstein, supra note 87, at 324 (internal citations omitted). 
 90 See Burstein, supra note 87, at 315. 
 91 589 F.2d 152 (4th Cir. 1978). 
 92 Id. at 160 (concluding that the information was “property” under the 
federal wire fraud statute). 
 93 See Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and 
“Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1610 (2003). 
 94 Id. at 1611.  
 95 See Joseph F. Savage, Jr. et al., Trade Secrets: Conflicting Views of the 
Economic Espionage Act, 15 CRIM. JUST. 10, 11 (2000). 
 96 Burstein supra note 87, at 323–24. 
 97 Id. at 325–26. 
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EEA, there is no need to prove copyright infringement, which 
can often prove difficult.98 Furthermore, the definition of “theft” 
of a trade secret under the EEA is broader than the definition 
used in the Restatement Third, or UTSA. Both sections 1831 
and 1832 allow for five categories of theft: (1) outright theft; (2) 
unauthorized duplication; (3) trafficking in stolen information; 
(4) attempting to commit these three offenses; and (5) 
conspiring to commit these three offenses.99 Section 1832 does 
not even require the existence of an actual trade secret under 
the attempt and conspiracy theories.100 Due to these lax 
standards, successful prosecutions under the EEA have been 
rapidly increasing in the last few years.101 
Ultimately, developments in the common law, evidenced 
by Kewanee, Monsanto, and the Restatement Third, along with 
the passage of the EEA, leave no doubt that trade secret 
protection has been broadly extended. Furthermore, it is quite 
apparent that this expansion has benefited industry. Trade 
secret’s original intellectual foundation was replaced by the 
economic policy goals of classic forms of intellectual property, 
i.e., patent and copyright law. Yet it was not always this way. 
The next section will explain how trade secret law diverged 
from its original intellectual foundation and will illustrate the 
practical problems that result from the added protections built 
into the law.  
III. TRADE SECRET LAW’S THEORETICAL DEVIATION FROM ITS 
ORIGINAL DOCTRINAL FOUNDATION AND PRACTICAL 
PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK 
Although currently trade secret law is firmly 
entrenched in an intellectual property regime with property 
  
 98 This is likely the reason that Robert Keppel, whom was accused of trade 
secret theft for selling Microsoft certification exams over the internet, was not charged 
with copyright infringement. See Press Release, CCIPS, Former Vancouver, 
Washington, Resident Pleads Guilty to Theft of Trade Secrets from Microsoft 
Corporation (Aug. 23, 2002), at http://www.cybercrime.gov/keppelPlea.htm (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2005). 
 99 See 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a)(5) (2000) (“[C]onspires with one or more other 
persons to commit any offense described in any of paragraphs (1) through (3), and one 
or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy . . . .”). 
 100 See United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 198 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[A]ttempt and 
conspiracy . . . do not require proof of the existence of an actual trade secret . . . .”). 
 101 See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Computer Crime and 
Intellectual Property Section: Economic Espionage Act Cases, at http://www.cyber 
crime.gov/eeapub.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2005) [hereinafter DOJ, CCIPS: EEA 
Cases]. 
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rights justified by an incentive-based rationale, the law was 
developed around the premise that property rights in trade 
secrets were created through the common-law “rule of capture.” 
Part III.A explores the theoretical deviation from trade secret 
law’s original doctrinal foundation and Part III.B describes the 
practical problems that have resulted therefrom. 
A. The Abandonment of Trade Secret’s Firm Foundation 
The current conceptualization of trade secrets as a form 
of intellectual property is fundamentally inconsistent with 
trade secret law’s original doctrinal foundation, which was 
based on the common-law rule of capture. To understand where 
the modern law has gone awry, it is necessary to start from the 
beginning. As Judge Robert H. Bork has eloquently explained, 
historical analysis is a powerful tool in exposing current legal 
misconceptions: 
One of the uses of history is to free us of a falsely imagined past. The 
less we know of how ideas actually took root and grew, the more apt 
we are to accept them unquestioningly, as inevitable features of the 
world in which we move. [M]ost of us accept our first principles and 
even our intermediate premises uncritically, as given, because we 
assume that they were established theoretically and confirmed 
empirically by legislators and judges long ago.102 
1. From Common Law to the Restatement (First) of 
Torts: The Changing Face of Trade Secret Law 
The concept of a trade secret as we know it first took 
root in the late 1830s103 and sprouted into a judicially 
recognized right with the landmark 1868 opinion, Peabody v. 
Norfolk.104 The plaintiff, Peabody, invented a new secret process 
for making gunny cloth from jute butts. Peabody employed 
Norfolk, who signed a written contract obligating him to keep 
the process secret. Norfolk later left Peabody’s employment and 
  
 102 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 
15 (1993). 
 103 See Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. 523 (1837) (upholding the sale of the rights 
to the secret art of making chocolate). 
 104 98 Mass. 452 (1868). For a more in-depth discussion of Peabody, see Bone, 
supra note 12, at 252-54. Bone, supra note 12, at 253 (citing Peabody, 98 Mass. at 457-
58 (referring specifically to trademark law, patent law, and trade secret law)). Bone, 
supra note 12, at 253 (citing Peabody, 98 Mass. at 457-58 (referring specifically to 
trademark law, patent law, and trade secret law)). 
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used the secret process to build a competing factory with James 
Cook. Peabody sought an injunction against the continued 
operation of the new factory.105 Among other defenses, Cook 
argued that his original agreement with Peabody was 
unenforceable because it was made in restraint of trade. 
Rejecting Cook’s argument, Justice Gray of the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court held Peabody’s trade secret to 
be a property right that was not constrained by contractual 
doctrines. This property right, Gray explained, was rooted in 
the Lockean concept that Peabody’s personal effort in 
enhancing the economic value of his business granted him a 
property right in his trade secret: “If a man establishes a 
business and makes it valuable by his skill and attention, the 
good will of that business is recognized by the law as 
property.”106 Gray explained the implications this general 
principle had for trade secret law:  
If [a person] invents or discovers, and keeps secret, a process of 
manufacture, whether a proper subject for a patent or not, he has 
not indeed an exclusive right to it as against the public, or against 
those who in good faith acquire knowledge of it; but he has property 
in it, which a court of chancery will protect against one who in 
violation of contract and breach of confidence undertakes to apply it 
to his own use . . . .107  
Although the court spoke of a “property” right, it had 
difficulty applying traditional property concepts—developed 
with respect to tangible property—to the intangible object of 
information. During this Natural Law period some judges and 
theorists explained this difficulty away by utilizing a Lockean 
conception of property for intangible ideas.108 John Locke 
theorized that property rights originated in individual labor 
and the productive use of property.109 The concept of property 
during the late nineteenth century was explicitly linked to this 
  
 105 See Bone, supra note 12, at 252-53. 
 106 Peabody, 98 Mass. at 457. This broad principle was “clearly intended . . . to 
unify all branches of what is today known as ‘intellectual property law.’” Bone, supra 
note 12, at 253 (citing Peabody, 98 Mass. at 457-58 (referring specifically to trademark 
law, patent law, and trade secret law)). 
 107 Peabody, 98 Mass., at 457-58 (emphasis added). 
 108 See Bone, supra note 12, at 254. 
 109 See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 17-18 (Bobbs-
Merrill ed. 1952) (1690) (“Whatsoever then [a person] removes out of the state that 
nature has provided and left it in, he has mixed his labor with, and joined to it 
something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.”) 
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Lockean concept of labor and physical possession.110 The notion 
was that the first possessor received property rights as a 
reward for their labor.111 Modern economic arguments, such as 
the incentive-based argument currently advanced for trade 
secrets had not been developed.112 
Of all the “bundle” of rights associated with property 
ownership, the concept of exclusivity was the most difficult to 
apply. The terminology used by the court in Peabody illustrates 
this confusion. While the court stated that the owner of a trade 
secret had a “property” right in his manufacturing process, the 
right was said not to be “exclusive to [the holder] as against the 
public.”113 In other words, the trade secret owner did not possess 
one of the most important sticks in the bundle of property 
rights—the right to exclude. 
To account for this deficiency, ambitious courts 
attempted to rationalize property rights in intangible ideas by 
analogizing them to the common-law rule of capture.114 The 
analogy between ideas and animals ran deep.115 Just as animals 
were captured through physical labor and protected only to the 
extent that they remained confined, ideas were captured 
through discovery and protected only to the extent that they 
remained secret.116 If the secret escaped, then it became public 
property. Thus the only way to maintain one’s property rights 
in information at common law was to keep it secret. This was a 
direct extension of the generally accepted Lockean concept of 
just-deserved rights, and was therefore well received. In 1904, 
the Second Circuit, in Werckmeister v. American Lithographic 
Co., described this common-law reasoning as follows:  
[Ideas] are as free as the birds of the air or the wild beasts of the 
forest, but they belong to him who first reduces them to captivity. . . . 
  
 110 See Ghen v. Rich, 8 Fed. 159, 161 (D. Mass. 1881) (attaching the right of 
property in a whale to the first person that shoots the whale with a distinctively 
marked harpoon); Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 177-78 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (attaching 
property in a fox to the first person bringing it under control, articulating the well-
known “capture rule”). 
 111 See SINGER, supra note 47, at 16-18. For an argument in favor of this rule 
see generally Richard Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221 
(1979). 
 112 See Bone, supra note 12, at 253. 
 113 Id. at 253. 
 114 Id. at 254. 
 115 This analogy was expressly made in the common-law copyright case of 
Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 Fed. 321, 324 (2d Cir. 1904), which is 
quoted infra text accompanying note 117.  
 116 Bone, supra note 12, at 255. 
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To pursue the foregoing analogies, the common-law protection 
continues only so long as the captives or—creations are kept in 
confinement or controlled.117 
Hence, during these formative years, all branches of 
intellectual property law were conceptualized through the “rule 
of capture.” At common law, exclusive possession was 
necessary for property rights to attach.118 These common-law 
principles, in turn, applied to all forms of information: 
“possession” of information required both discovery and 
exclusion through secrecy. Once the information found its way 
into the commons, though, the property right disappeared and 
instead was owned communally.119 
It is at this point that trade secret law diverged from 
other forms of intellectual property law—to wit, patent and 
copyright law. While trade secret law remained a creature of a 
common-law system that did not protect information once it 
became public, the early Patent and Copyright Acts protected 
the ideas when they were released into the public. It was 
reasoned that since the ideas were now “public property,” it 
was up to the public to enact protective legislation.120 Yet unlike 
patent and copyright law, no statutes were passed to protect 
trade secrets once they entered the public domain.  
This extra layer of statutory protection afforded to a 
copyright owner by virtue of statutory right is exemplified by 
Werckmeister. In Werckmeister, the common-law copyright 
principles allowed for the creator to release his “captured” 
ideas first, but did not protect the ideas once they were let 
free—it only protected the copyrighted material prior to its 
publication.121 But, because there was a statute involved, the 
court explained that subsequent public dissemination did not 
destroy the creator’s property rights: “[t]he statute permits [the 
ideas] to go free and releases the restraint, provided the owner 
has stamped them with his brand.”122  
  
 117 Werckmeister, 134 Fed. at 324. 
 118 See Bone, supra note 12, at 254. 
 119 See id. at 255 (citing Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. Tubbs Mfg. Co., 216 F. 401, 407 
(W.D. Mich. 1908) (“The property in a secret process is the power to make use of it to 
the exclusion of the world. If the world knows the process, then the property 
disappears.”) (quoting Cincinnati Bell Foundry Co. v. Dodds, 10 Ohio Dic. Reprint 154 
(1887))). 
 120 See Bone, supra note 12, at 255. 
 121 Werckmeister, 134 Fed. at 324. 
 122 Id.  
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During these formative years, the common-law 
principles that protected an owner’s interest in intangible ideas 
prior to publication were consensually viewed as superior to 
the post-publication statutory protections.123 While common-law 
schemes were firmly rooted in the historically and culturally 
accepted Lockean concept of just-deserved rights, statutes were 
viewed simply as “expressions of historically and culturally 
contingent social policy”124 whose added protections granted to 
copyright and patents through statute were not viewed as 
firmly rooted. In fact, it was thought that trade secret law’s 
strong link to the common law made it a superior method of 
protection to the post-publication protections afforded through 
the statutory patent and copyright schemes.125 Hence, at this 
stage trade secret law had a firm foundation of policy grounded 
in these common-law concepts. 
With the advent of legal realism, however, courts and 
scholars abandoned this firm basis.126 Around the early 1920s 
the age of legal realism brought an entirely new and more 
“modern” conceptualization of trade secret protection.127 The 
change in legal philosophy undermined the common-law 
property rights approach of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Especially weakened was the claim “that 
exclusivity through secrecy implied property and that property 
implied legal rights [in trade secrets] . . . .”128 During this 
period, the basis for liability stemmed not from the defendant’s 
violation of the holder’s property right granted at common law, 
but instead was based on the wrongfulness of the defendant’s 
conduct. This new approach focused on the relationship 
between the trade secret holder and the alleged wrongdoer. In 
  
 123 See Bone, supra note 12, at 256 (“These statutory rights were treated as 
subordinate to common-law property rights . . . .”). 
 124 Id. (citing 1 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 90-110 
(1881); Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conception of Ideal 
Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9-26 
(1989); Robert G. Bone, Normative Theory and Legal Doctrine in American Nuisance 
Law: 1850 to 1920, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1101, 1112-22 (1986)). 
 125 Bone, supra note 12, at 256. 
 126 Id. at 259-60. 
 127 See id. at 259 (citing ROBERT SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN 
LEGAL THEORY (1982); WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST 
MOVEMENT (1973); G. Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: 
Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 
999 (1972)). 
 128 Bone, supra note 12, 259. 
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E.I. duPont deNemours Powder Co. v. Masland,129 Justice 
Holmes encouraged this view: 
Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable secret or not the defendant 
knows the facts, whatever they are, through a special confidence 
that he accepted. The property may be denied but the confidence 
cannot be. Therefore the starting point for the present matter is not 
property or due process of law, but that the defendant stood in 
confidential relations with the plaintiffs . . . .130  
In his explanation, Justice Holmes clearly stated that 
the starting point of analyzing liability for the 
misappropriation of secret information was “not property,” but 
the “confidential relations” shared by the parties.131 This 
approach effectively changed how secret information was 
protected under the law of trade secrets. This evolution in 
trade secret law shifted the legal framework from common-law 
property rights, which focused upon the rights which attached 
to the plaintiff’s secret, to a new theory that focused upon the 
wrongful conduct of the defendant. Essentially, the property 
rights rationale was abandoned and the basis of liability was 
now closer to contract and tort law; liability hinged on whether 
the wrongdoer had violated a confidence, not a property right. 
At this point, courts and scholars alike rebuked the idea 
that the owner of a trade secret had a property interest in that 
secret. In 1938, the Restatement (First) of Torts, which 
contained the first-ever unified definition of a trade secret, 
reported that the property conception “has been frequently 
advanced and rejected.”132 Instead, the Restatement (First) of 
Torts explained that the theory of liability rested upon “a 
general duty of good faith.”133 No longer was it thought 
necessary to define a trade secret holder’s right as a property 
interest. Professor Handler summed up the feeling of the era 
nicely: “For one to reap with impunity the fruits of another’s 
labor may be reprehensible, but the creation of new species of 
property interests and new series of monopolies by the courts 
may be disastrous to free enterprise.”134 Hence, the idea of 
property rights in trade secrets were not only abandoned, but 
altogether denounced. 
  
 129 244 U.S. 100 (1917). 
 130 Id. at 102. 
 131 Id. 
 132 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a (1939). 
 133 Id. 
 134 Milton Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IOWA L. REV. 175, 189 (1936). 
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This new conceptualization of trade secrets presented a 
problem. The new theoretical model deviated from trade 
secret’s original foundation, and remained unconvincing. The 
law no longer possessed the strong foundation upon which to 
rest its policy that it had during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.135 No longer did trade secrets possess a 
strong “justifying theory and . . . normative independence from 
other fields of law.”136 Instead, trade secrets were now protected 
by forbidding the wrongful conduct of another, just like 
contract or tort law. Yet the property-like characteristics of 
trade secrets, such as the ability to assign the secret, or its use 
as the res of a trust, made for an imperfect fit. The stripping 
away of trade secret’s common-law property foundation left a 
gap that courts and scholars have been trying to fill ever 
since.137 
In the 1970s and 1980s the Supreme Court attempted to 
fill this gap by adopting the policy goals for trade secrets that 
are commonly articulated to support more traditional forms of 
intellectual property, such as copyright and patent law.138 As 
the following section will illustrate more thoroughly, this too 
was an imperfect fit. The deviation from trade secret law’s 
original framework is in large part responsible for the 
unpromising current state of the law.  
In sum, trade secret law has been struggling to find a 
satisfactory framework and rationale after the collapse of its 
original theory. Liability was first grounded in a property 
rights rationale supported by the rule of capture. As legal 
concepts changed, liability was centered on the wrongful 
conduct to another and the concept of property rights was 
altogether dropped. As a result, trade secrets suddenly found a 
home in the Restatement (First) of Torts—an area of the law 
where it did not quite fit. Then, trade secrets were analogized 
to more traditional forms of intellectual property when the 
Supreme Court adopted the economic incentive-based 
argument used to support the existence of patent and copyright 
laws. As the following section will illustrate, this too was 
inappropriate. 
  
 135 Bone, supra note 12, at 260. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. at 260 n.90 (setting forth the major attempts by courts and 
commentators to justify trade secret law, including the idea of “unfair competition,” 
which was quite popular in the first half of the twentieth century). 
 138 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974). 
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2. An Unfit Rationale—Trade Secrets are Different 
The above historical tour reveals that, despite the 
Court’s current treatment of trade secret law as a form of 
intellectual property, the fit is quite poor. Trade secrets are 
different. The incentive-based policy rationale adopted in 
Kewanee does not fit trade secrets, as the quid pro quo of public 
disclosure does not exist. The policy rationales do not at all 
explain the need for protecting trade secrets as property. 
Furthermore, as a practical matter, the added protections built 
into the law through the EEA create a powerful tool for 
industry to exclude valuable discoveries from society, further 
imperiling the future of innovation. 
First, and foremost, the economic policy rationale that 
trade secrets enhance incentives to create, thereby benefiting 
society, is unconvincing. This incentive-based argument “is well 
established as the principal economic justification for 
intellectual property rights in general.”139 While the argument 
is compelling for both copyright and patent law, it is a very 
difficult sell with trade secret law. Even the scholars of the 
legal realism era that abandoned trade secret’s original firm 
basis recognized the danger of an explicitly economic 
justification. Indeed, the Restatement (First) of Torts expressly 
rejected this incentive-based rationale: 
The patent monopoly is a reward to the inventor. But such is not the 
case with a trade secret. Its protection is not based on a policy of 
rewarding or otherwise encouraging the development of secret 
processes or devices. The protection is merely against breach of faith 
and reprehensible means of learning another’s secret.140  
The Court in Kewanee also admitted that it is difficult to 
reconcile the secret element of trade secret law with the 
disclosure of patent law, which is “the quid pro quo of the right 
to exclude.”141 The Court reasoned convincingly that in most 
cases where trade secrets operate, the “law will encourage 
invention in areas where patent law does not reach, and will 
  
 139 Bone, supra note 12, at 262 (citing ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW 
AND ECONOMICS 112-16, 135-49 (1988)); see also William M. Landes & Richard A. 
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEG. STUD. 325-63 (1989) 
(applying the incentive-based argument to copyright); Kenneth W. Dam, the Economic 
Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEG. STUD. 247 (1994) (applying the incentive-
based argument to patent law). 
 140 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). 
 141 Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 484 (emphasis added). 
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prompt the independent innovator to proceed with the 
discovery and exploitation of his invention.”142 But it is when 
the inventor has a choice between using patent law and trade 
secret law where the Court’s reasoning is highly questionable. 
The majority argued that “[t]he possibility that an inventor 
who believes his invention meets the standards of patentability 
will sit back, rely on trade secret law, and after one year of use 
forfeit any right to patent protection . . . is remote indeed.”143 
The majority’s baseless assumption that an inventor 
would rarely rely on trade secret law in place of patent law was 
highly questionable then, and downright wrong now. Both 
Justice Marshall’s concurrence and Justice Douglas’ dissent 
called into question the majority’s key assumption in this area. 
Justice Marshall agreed with the Court’s decision that trade 
secret law was not in conflict with federal patent law, but he 
believed “that the existence of trade secret protection 
provide[d] . . . in some instances a substantial disincentive to 
entrance into the patent system, and thus deprives society of 
the benefits of public disclosure of the invention which it is the 
policy of the patent laws to encourage.”144 Justice Douglas’ 
dissenting opinion argued that trade secret law did in fact 
frustrate federal patent law’s objectives. As such, Douglas 
argued that the majority’s reasoning ran contrary to two of the 
Court’s earlier decisions; accordingly, he believed the state 
trade secret law regime was preempted by the federal patent 
scheme.145 
This area of tension between trade secrets and the 
policy goals of patent law, highlighted by Justices Douglas and 
Marshall, has grown even tauter today. Patent and copyright 
owners receive their property rights in exchange for disclosure 
  
 142 Id. at 485. 
 143 Id. at 490. 
 144 Id. at 494 (J. Marshall, concurring). 
 145 Justice Douglas argued: 
Today’s decision is at war with the philosophy of Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. 
Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 
U.S. 234. We held that when an article is unprotected by a patent, state law 
may not forbid others to copy it, because every article not covered by a valid 
patent is in the public domain. Congress in the patent laws decided that 
where no patent existed, free competition should prevail; that where a patent 
is rightfully issued, the right to exclude others should obtain for no longer 
than 17 years, and that the States may not “under some other law, such as 
that forbidding unfair competition, give protection of a kind that clashes with 
the objectives of he federal patent laws[.]”  
Id. at 495 (J. Douglas, dissenting). 
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to society. With trade secret law, this disclosure could 
theoretically never take place. It is this area of tension that 
runs contrary to the second stated policy rationale of trade 
secret law: “encourag[ing] creation” for the betterment of 
society as a whole.146 The argument that society loses little in 
the process may hold merit when it comes to trade secrets such 
as advertising campaigns, customer lists and business 
methods, but it runs contrary to the policy of public disclosure 
when it comes to patentable items of invention, processes, 
procedures and techniques that would benefit society. The 
rarity in which an occasion like this was thought to occur may 
explain the Court’s decision at the time, but it definitely calls 
into question whether providing a property right to the holder 
is justified if these occasions become increasingly common. 
With the numerous added protections currently built into the 
law, the incentive to keep an invention a trade secret, where 
disclosure could theoretically never take place, has increased 
tremendously. 
Furthermore, the first policy rationale articulated by 
the Court in Kewanee—that trade secret law encourages 
commercial ethics—is not a convincing reason to supply 
property rights. This policy rationale is justified as protecting 
the traditional community norms that have developed over 
time. But as one commentator laments, this justification 
sounds more like “lofty aspirational goals” than a workable 
framework of law.147 Moreover, it is not necessary to create a 
property right to safeguard commercial norms. As Justice 
Holmes explained, liability may be predicated on a tort or 
contract theory that imposes liability based on a defendant’s 
wrongful conduct.148 The idea that trade secret law encourages 
commercial ethics appears to be more of an added benefit to 
protecting interests in trade secrets than it is an actual 
rationale for protecting them as “property.” Hence, the 
  
 146 See Kewanee 416 U.S. at 481. 
 147 Chiappetta, supra note 17, at 86. 
 148 Justice Holmes argued for a rationale based more upon a contract or tort 
theory, where liability was based upon the violation of a confidence. He famously 
stated:  
Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable secret or not, the defendant knows 
the facts, whatever they are, through a special confidence that he accepted. 
The property may be denied but the confidence cannot be. Therefore the 
starting point for the present matter is not property or due process of law, but 
that the defendant stood in confidential relations with the plaintiffs . . . .  
E.I. duPont deNemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917). 
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Monsanto decision, which recognized trade secrets as property 
under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment, is not 
supported by these poorly developed rationales. 
Monsanto’s faulty reasoning is further evidenced by the 
fact that the Court was forced to revert to formalistic notions of 
property to justify granting a property right to Monsanto.149 The 
Court used language that harped back to the formalistic rule of 
capture analysis from the late nineteenth century, utilizing the 
natural rights concept of “just deserved” property rights 
through “labour.”150 This is telling because it indicates that 
property rights in trade secrets cannot rest squarely upon the 
economic justification explicitly expressed for trade secret law, 
and borrowed from traditional forms of intellectual property, 
i.e., copyright and patent law. In addition, this incentive-based 
economic rationale leads many towards the mistaken belief 
that trade secret law is simply another form of intellectual 
property. The reality, as one commentator so simply stated, is 
quite the opposite: “Trade secret law is fundamentally 
different.”151  
The recognition of a property right in trade secrets has 
attracted much controversy. One commentator has opined that 
trade secret law “is merely a collection of other legal norms—
contract, fraud, and the like—united only by the fact that they 
are used to protect secret information.”152 Indeed, “[t]he 
relational focus of trade secret’s liability rules aligns trade 
secret law more closely with the law of contract than with the 
law of property.”153 Hence, a property right in trade secrets is 
arguably altogether unnecessary, as other legal theories, such 
as contract and tort law, possess all the tools necessary to 
protect against the misappropriation of ideas.  
Yet despite the problems noted above, trade secret law 
expanded on the criminal front without attempting to sort 
through the doctrinal morass. The EEA, passed to benefit 
industry, is essentially a canon being used to kill a mosquito. 
Scholars complain that the over-broad language remedied the 
ills of industrial espionage too thoroughly.154 For example, 
  
 149 See text accompanying notes 61-62. 
 150 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003 (1984); see also text 
accompanying note 62.  
 151 Bone, supra note 12, at 244. 
 152 Id. at 245.  
 153 Id. at 244. 
 154 See, e.g., Moohr, supra note 86, at 884; Burstein, supra note 87, at 326. 
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Professor Moohr argues that the EEA’s expansive definition of 
trade secrets expands the range of protected material so much 
so that it “raises constitutional vagueness and notice issues.”155 
Professor Burstein argues that this expansion creates an 
incentive for prosecutors to utilize the EEA rather than other 
federal criminal statutes because the elements are much easier 
to make out.156 
Until 1996, trade secret law was solely developed and 
cultivated under state law. As rationales justifying trade 
secrets shifted back and forth in the courts and 
Restatements,157 Congress was curiously indifferent. Although 
large sections of the United States Code are dedicated to 
patent158 and copyright law,159 federal legislation has only come 
recently in the law of trade secrets and is quite sparse.160 Yet as 
the tendency to analogize trade secrets to other forms of 
intellectual property increased, Congress’s indifference was 
intriguingly replaced with fervor to strengthen a law that was 
already sorely misunderstood. 
What is extremely troubling about the EEA is that 
legislative history shows absolutely no evidence of a 
substantive discussion of how the EEA would interact with 
trade secret law’s stated policy goal of encouraging innovation 
for the benefit of society.161 Rather, the committee reports and 
floor debates illustrate the one-sided, pro-business nature of 
the EEA. Indeed, Congress did not hear any testimony from 
experts in the intellectual property field. In fact, all of the 
testimony was given by self-interested industry experts.162 The 
result is a law that has received much criticism from scholars,163 
while providing extremely strong protections for industry.  
  
 155 Moohr, supra note 86, at 884. 
 156 Burstein, supra note 87, at 325-26. 
 157 See supra Part II.A. 
 158 The entirety of Title 17 is dedicated to Copyright Law. See Copyright Act, 
17 U.S.C §§ 101–1301 (2000).  
 159 The entirety of Title 35 is dedicated to Patent Law. See Patent Act, 35 
U.S.C. §§ 1–331 (2000). 
 160 See Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–39 (2000).  
 161 See Craig L. Uhrich, The Economic Espionage Act—Reverse Engineering 
and the Intellectual Property Public Policy, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 147, 
171 (2001) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 104-788, at 4-8 (1996)) (discussing the importance of 
proprietary information and the inadequacy of state civil remedies); S. Rep. No. 104-
359, at 5-12 (1996) (adding reports of the increasing incidence of economic espionage 
and a discussion of the need for a comprehensive federal law). 
 162 See Uhrich, supra note 161, at 170–71. 
 163 See, e.g., id.; Moohr, supra note 86, at 884.  
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Ultimately, the current trade secret scheme is deeply 
entrenched in a property right regime, but the policy goals 
currently supporting the law do not fit. Not only has this new 
theoretical model deviated from trade secret’s original 
foundation, but also as a practical matter, the added 
protections built into the law have effectively swung the 
pendulum directly towards the interests of industry. As will be 
shown in the next section, this current theoretical framework 
has the unfortunate consequence of constricting socially 
beneficial innovation.  
B.  Practical Problems with the Current Trade Secret 
Framework: De Facto Monopolies and Collective Action 
Dilemmas 
  
As trade secret holders enjoy the added protections built 
into the law, society suffers as the law’s tendency to strangle 
innovation increases. In particular, owners of chemical 
inventions may enjoy de facto monopolies in their ideas 
because they are usually impossible to reverse engineer. 
Constricting the free-flow of information creates a collective 
action problem whereby inventors cannot build upon the ideas 
of others.  
1.  De Facto Monopolies: Inventions that are 
“Beneficial to Society” but Impossible to Reverse 
Engineer 
Chemical inventions, which are extremely difficult to 
reverse engineer, can enjoy a much longer period of exclusive 
use if the inventor does not apply for a patent.164 Daniel C. 
Munson, a chemical inventor and lawyer, argues that certain 
industrial inventions are better candidates for trade secret 
protection than others.165 Whereas electrical or mechanical 
inventions are easily reverse engineered, as evidenced by the 
  
 164 See Daniel C. Munson, The Patent-Trade Secret Decision: An Industrial 
Perspective, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 689, 699–702 (1996).  
 165 See generally id. Ironically, Munson comes to the conclusion, despite his 
earlier contentions, that federal patent law does not preempt state trade secret law 
because patents are easier to obtain for chemical inventions than other types. 
Munson’s conclusion appears inapposite to the weight of his paper, which  enumerates 
the many reasons a chemical inventor would prefer trade secret protection. 
Furthermore, as trade secret law receives increased protection it is reasonable to 
conclude that it could become even more attractive to these same inventors. 
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legion of suits filed in the early 1990s involving semiconductor 
design, chemical compounds cannot be. Thus, as a practical 
matter, trade secret protection is impossible to maintain for 
mechanical or electric inventions, but almost assured for 
chemical formulae.166 For example, the formula for Coca-Cola 
has never been reverse engineered, even though it has existed 
for well over a hundred years.167 As one of the most well-known 
and profitable companies in the world,168 the formula is 
undoubtedly a great target for reverse engineering. 
Nevertheless, not a single manufacturer has been able to 
duplicate it.  
However, although the secrecy of a soft drink formula is 
hardly detrimental, suppression of information poses a very 
real problem when the nature of that information is socially 
beneficial. For example, suppose a company discovers a 
formula for a clean-burning fuel alternative, a product 
extremely difficult to reverse engineer. Further assume that 
the company is a subsidiary of an oil company. This company 
could either patent the technology and suppress it for twenty 
years,169 or keep it as a trade secret. Given these two choices, a 
company would likely choose to go the trade secret route 
because, assuming the information could not be discovered 
independently, the company could effectively maintain 
indefinite and exclusive use of its invention. Nothing prevents 
that company from shielding the rest of the world from the 
benefits of that invention forever. In fact, federal criminal laws 
provide harsh sanctions for anyone who discloses the formula.170 
  
 166 See id. at 690–97. 
 167 See The Coca-Cola Company at http://heritage.coca-cola.com (last visited 
Apr. 25, 2005). The drink was invented by John Pemberton, an Atlanta pharmacist, in 
1886. Id. To this day, almost 120 years later, the formula has remained a secret. 
 168 The aggregate market value of the common equity of the Coca-Cola 
Company as of June 30, 2004 was over $105 billion. See The Coca-Cola Company, 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Form 10-K, available at 
http://www2.coca-cola.com/investors/pdfs/form_10K_2004.pdf (last visited May 11, 
2005). 
 169 This example is very similar to the actions taken by Standard Oil in 1929. 
“Once Standard Oil acquired [hydrogenation process] patent rights, it showed little 
interest in using the hydrogenation processes in production. Instead, it was more 
interested in blocking the threat that liquid fuels and coal lubricants posed to the oil 
industry.” Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a 
Deterrent to Technology Suppression, 15 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 389, 409 (2002).  
 170 Under 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)-(b) the maximum fine for individual offenders is 
$ 250,000, the same as for mail and wire fraud. Id. § 3571(b) (providing the general fine 
provision). Penalties for violations that benefit foreign governments, instrumentalities, 
or agents carry a penalty for individuals of fines up to $500,000 and imprisonment not 
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While current regulations already guide pharmaceutical 
products towards the law of patents,171 there are other areas of 
industry where beneficial inventions may be kept secret to the 
detriment of society forever. 
The above example is not farfetched. Intellectual 
property has been utilized to shield the public from socially 
beneficial inventions in the past.172 Indeed, companies have 
often used intellectual property law as a means of withholding 
ideas that are beneficial to society, but harmful to their bottom 
line.173 For example, in the 1960s Liggett & Myers Company 
discovered and patented174 the “XA” cigarette, a cigarette with 
most of the carcinogenic agents removed. However, for various 
reasons, it was never released to the public and all of the 
research was suppressed.175 Liggett finally announced plans to 
release the “safer” cigarette in 2001, after the tobacco industry 
finally admitted to the carcinogenic effects of smoking.176 Had 
Liggett introduced the product sooner, many lives could have 
been spared. At the least, an earlier release of the XA cigarette 
would have spurred other cigarette companies to seek out 
similar developments. Instead, this knowledge was suppressed 
for many years.  
This is just one of many examples of intellectual 
property rights being used to suppress ideas that could prove 
  
more than fifteen years. Id. at § 1831(a). When the defendant is an organization, the 
fine may reach $10 million. Id.  
 171 Due to strong public welfare concerns, the pharmaceutical industry is 
heavily regulated by the government. Extensive disclosure and testing is often required 
before a product is deemed approved for massive public release. Thus, trade secret law 
is a poor fit for protection here. See Munson, supra note 164, at 698 n.22. 
 172 See, e.g., Saunders, supra note 169, at 392-93; Michael A. Gollin, Using 
Intellectual Property to Improve Environmental Protection, 4 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 193, 
223 (1992). 
 173 See Saunders, supra note 169, at 395–96. 
 174 There can be no empirical data from the realm of trade secret law directly 
proving this premise because trade secrets are just that—secret. An example from 
patent law here illustrates that companies will suppress knowledge or developments if 
they could hurt their bottom line. 
 175 See Saunders, supra note 169, at 393 (citing First Am. Compl., City & 
County of San Francisco v. Philip Morris, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 1996) (No. C-96-2090-DLJ), 
available at http://stic.neu.edu/ca/sf/1stamcomplaint.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2005)).  
  The reasoning behind this was that admitting there could possibly be a 
safer cigarette would imply that existing cigarettes were in fact dangerous. 
Furthermore, Phillip Morris allegedly threatened retaliation if Liggett released 
information regarding smoking and health. See id. at 394. 
 176 See id at 394-95. 
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extremely beneficial to society but harmful to a company’s 
bottom line.177 
2. Trade Secret Protection in Research Developments 
and Collective Action Dilemmas 
A related problem to idea suppression occurs when 
trade secrets are granted for research developments in 
chemical compounds that are beneficial to society. Although, 
due to government regulations, an actual cure for cancer would 
need to be patented in order to be distributed publicly,178 a 
discovery that constitutes a significant step towards that cure 
does not. This means that trade secrets will protect a broad 
array of information that does not formally qualify for patent 
protection. 
As exemplified by the recent case of Teller v. Teller,179 
there is a rather low threshold for property rights to vest in a 
trade secret. In Teller, the Supreme Court of Hawaii had to 
decide precisely when a property right vested in a trade 
secret.180 Mrs. Teller agreed that Mr. Teller’s secret weather 
radio invention was created three months prior to their 
marriage, thus qualifying as “pre-marital property” under 
Hawaii law, and rendering the property “separate” for purposes 
of equitable distribution. The court reasoned that “one owns a 
property right in a trade secret when one knows of it . . . .”181 
This means that a trade secret is certain to vest before the 
property right in a patent because under federal law the right 
in a patent accrues once it is issued by the Patent Office.182 
  
 177 For numerous other examples see id. at 407–17. 
 178 Government regulations make disclosures mandatory, so that drugs can be 
tested and FDA approval can be issued prior to distribution. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(n). 
The section states in pertinent part: 
In the case of any prescription drug distributed or offered for sale in any 
State [the following must be disclosed] . . . (2) the formula showing 
quantitatively each ingredient of such drug to the extent required for labels . 
. . , and (3) such other information in brief summary relating to side effects, 
contraindications, and effectiveness as shall be required in regulations which 
shall be issued by the Secretary in accordance with the procedure . . . .  
Id. 
 179 53 P.3d 240 (Haw. 2002). 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. at 249 (quoting DTM Research, LLC v. AT&T Corp. 245 F.3d 327, 332 
(4th Cir. 2001)). 
 182 See id. at 250 (citing GAF Bldg. Materials Corp. v. Elk Corp. of Dallas, 90 
F.3d 479, 483 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
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Hence, the holder of a trade secret has a property right in that 
secret as soon as it is discovered. 183  
Yet deciding that property rights vest from the moment 
of discovery harms innovation. Future innovators will not be 
able to learn from the crucial insights. Moreover, other firms 
will continue to research the same area, thus duplicating 
efforts.184  
A pending case being prosecuted by the U.S. 
Department of Justice—United States v. Zhu,185 illustrates that 
research developments will be receiving protection under trade 
secret criminal laws. In June of 2002, a pair of research fellows 
at Harvard University were charged under the EEA for the 
theft of trade secrets from a Harvard laboratory.186 It was 
alleged that the two stole proprietary and highly valuable 
scientific information belonging to Harvard with the intention 
of profiting from such information by collaborating with a 
Japanese company. The information in question was the 
derivative of two genes that blocked the activity of calcineurin. 
This genetic derivative possibly offered a way to treat a 
number of diseases affecting the immune, cardiovascular, and 
nervous systems.187 Although the discoveries were made by the 
two research fellows being prosecuted, they signed a 
Participation Agreement that assigned all property rights to 
discoveries and inventions to Harvard. Furthermore, the two 
research fellows used the Harvard laboratory, which was 
funded in part by the National Health and the American 
Cancer Society, along with Harvard’s information, technology 
and chemical reagents to discover the genes.188  
Although the behavior of the two research assistances 
appeared criminal, the case highlights the overly broad 
protection afforded to socially beneficial information. Critically, 
the information involved in this case was not easily reverse 
engineered and had the potential to benefit society greatly. 
  
 183 See id. at 249. “This is an intensely fact-driven analysis because the 
moment at which an idea blossoms into a property right protected by statute will in 
large part, be dependent upon the content of the secret.” Id.  
 184 See Bone, supra note 12, at 266-67. 
 185 See DOJ, CCIPS: EEA Cases, at http://www.cybercrime. gov/eeapub.htm 
(last visited Apr. 20, 2005).  
 186 See Press Release, CCIPS, Pair Charged with Theft of Trade Secrets from 
Harvard Medical School, (June 19, 2002), at http://www.cybercrime.gov/zhu 
Charges.htm (last visited April 20, 2005). 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. 
 2/16/2005 2:38:18 PM 
1154 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:3 
Moreover, by bringing a criminal action, the government 
appeared to cast the EEA’s protective net over information that 
was not in itself a complete product, but rather information 
that constituted a critical step to finding a cure. After all, the 
newly discovered genes may have been crucial parts of a 
process that could lead to cures for a number of diseases. 
Nonetheless, the consequences appear dire for the research 
fellows. Although the case has yet to be tried, acquittals are 
very rare under sections 1831 and 1832.189  
But protecting these ideas as property before an actual 
invention is fully realized risks potentially locking away 
valuable ideas that lead to larger discoveries forever. 
Economists refer to this as a collective action problem. An 
economic model known as game theory explores this concept.190 
A simple and often cited example to illustrate a collective 
action problem is the Prisoner’s Dilemma: 
Two criminals are arrested. They both have committed a serious 
crime, but the district attorney cannot convict either of them for this 
crime without extracting at least one confession. The district 
attorney can, however, convict them both on a lesser offense without 
the cooperation of either. The district attorney tells each prisoner 
that if neither confesses, they will both be convicted of the lesser 
offense. Each will go to prison for two years. If, however, one of the 
prisoners confesses and the other does not, the former will go free 
and the latter will be tried for the serious crime and given the 
maximum penalty of ten years in prison. If both confess, the district 
attorney will prosecute them for the serious crime but will not ask 
for the maximum penalty. They will both go to prison for six years.191 
Although the best choice is for both to remain silent, the 
prisoners’ inability to communicate with each other means that 
they will both likely choose the inferior option.192 A similar 
dilemma could very easily take place in the realm of trade 
secret law. Let us assume that there are two companies, A and 
B, which both employ scientists to search for a clean-burning 
alternative to gasoline. Scientist A will not make the discovery 
because he cannot find the missing link to his formula, which is 
otherwise almost complete. Scientist B has discovered this 
  
 189 The Department of Justice has not lost many of their attempts to prosecute 
thus far under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. See DOJ, CCIPS: EEA Cases, at 
http://www.cybercrime.gov/eeapub.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).  
 190 See generally Maxwell L. Stearns, A Beautiful Mend: A Game Theoretical 
Analysis of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 45 WM & MARY L. REV. 1 (2003). 
 191 DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 33 (1994). 
 192 See id. 
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missing link, but does not know how to apply it. This 
knowledge will be kept secret forever in hopes that Company A, 
where Scientist A works, will eventually discover the 
information that Scientist B already has. Company B will keep 
this discovery secret in the hope that it will one day make the 
discoveries that Company A already has. Since the current 
trade secret scheme encourages innovation through financial 
reward, creating an atmosphere of competition, these secrets 
must be kept at all costs in order to maintain a competitive 
advantage over the other firm. Scientists A and B cannot 
communicate because the information is the property of their 
respective companies and is protected by federal criminal 
statutes193 as well as civil common-law systems. Consequently, 
the information could be held captive forever.  
As Companies A and B continue researching and 
developing a clean-burning alternative to gasoline, both will be 
expending unnecessary time and money. However, if both 
companies were able to gain knowledge from the other through 
collective action, the clean-burning alternative to gasoline 
would be invented, and the two companies would share the 
patent rights. Therefore, as in the prisoner’s dilemma, both 
companies would be better off if they were able to coordinate 
their actions. However they are not currently able to do so 
because of preclusive barriers to collective action.194 The tools of 
game theory identify this problem and provide a framework for 
understanding the optimal regulation of information 
transferal.195 
Ultimately, the current trade secret framework 
discourages cooperation and has the potential to shield socially 
beneficial ideas from the public forever. De facto monopolies in 
socially beneficial ideas flip the constitutionally mandated 
policy goal of benefiting society on its head. Hence a change in 
the law of trade secrets is necessary in order to further the 
public’s right to socially beneficial ideas.  
  
 193 Under 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)-(b) (2000) the maximum fine for individual 
offenders is $250,000. Id. § 3571(b) (providing the general fine provision). Penalties for 
violations that benefit foreign governments, instrumentalities, or agents carry a 
penalty for individuals of fines up to $500,000 and imprisonment not more than 15 
years. Id. at §1831(a). When the defendant is an organization, the fine may reach $ 10 
million. Id. at § 1831(a)-(b) 
 194 Albeit this is an extremely simplified hypothetical, yet “[t]he purpose of 
using economic tools to analyze legal problems is to build simple models that capture 
the forces at work.” BAIRD ET AL., supra note 191, at 269. 
 195 Id. at 268-69. 
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IV. SOLUTIONS TO THE ABOVE PROBLEMS: AN AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSE AND THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF COOPERATION 
The current trend of protectionism in the law of trade 
secrets has swung the pendulum too far in the direction of 
industry. As a result, society is suffering. The current trade 
secret apparatus must be altered so that the crucial balance 
necessary to benefit both society and industry is struck. The 
following two solutions hope to aid in swinging the pendulum 
back in the direction of society to reach that balance. First, an 
affirmative defense should be created to encourage the 
disclosure of socially beneficial developments that are being 
suppressed from the public. Second, the government should 
encourage and seek out ways to facilitate cooperation within 
those particular industries engaged in the production of 
socially beneficial products.  
A. Creating an Affirmative Defense for Theft of Trade 
Secrets that are “Beneficial to Society”  
Where an invention or idea stands to benefit the health 
and wellbeing of society, that invention or idea must find its 
way into society. The law should not act to constrict such 
knowledge, but should instead encourage spreading it as 
rapidly as possible. This section proposes the EEA be amended 
to create an affirmative defense that requires a defendant show 
that the information he/she improperly disclosed or stole was 
being suppressed by the company and would be of great 
“benefit to society.” This affirmative defense should also be 
utilized in civil actions for misappropriation. 
In Part III.B.1 this Note discussed the XA cigarette as 
an example of the problems that patent suppression present. 
As a proposed solution to the patent suppression problem, 
Professor Saunders points to a compulsory licensing system 
“whereby a court would order a patentee that is not using its 
patent to license the patent to another who will make use of 
it.”196 Michael Gollin, a lawyer with a background in 
biochemical science, also points to mandatory licensing 
provisions as a possible solution to ideas with environmental 
implications being suppressed.197 Gollin points to section 308 of 
  
 196 Saunders, supra note 169, at 434. 
 197 Gollin, supra note 172, at 223. 
 2/16/2005 2:38:18 PM 
2005] THE FUTURE OF INNOVATION 1157 
the Clean Air Act of 1970198 as a good example of legislation 
that forces patent holders to license their technology under 
directed circumstances.199 However, trade secrets do not fall 
under this provision.200 Gollin concludes that “[t]he treatment of 
trade secrets in the principal environmental statutes is 
inconsistent with promoting innovation.”201 
The difficulty with creating a mandatory licensing 
scheme for trade secrets is readily apparent. The most 
important element of the trade secret is secrecy. It is 
impossible to forcibly license something that you do not know 
exists. Hence, it is imperative that those inside be encouraged 
to divulge secrets that are of great benefit to society as a whole. 
Creating an absolute affirmative defense to any trade 
secret theft or misappropriation action, could help to swing the 
pendulum back in the favor of society. The onus would be on 
the defendant to make out three elements: First, the defendant 
must prove the trade secret is extremely difficult to discover 
independently and reverse engineer; next, the defendant must 
show that the trade secret in question would perform a 
valuable benefit to the health and wellbeing of society; and 
finally, that the company was suppressing its discovery. Thus, 
once it is proven by the plaintiff or prosecution that the 
knowledge or invention in question is a trade secret, the 
burden of proof would be upon the defendant to prove the three 
elements of the affirmative defense. 
The first element of the affirmative defense is: The 
invention is extremely difficult to reverse engineer. This element 
could be proven by expert testimony of scientists in the field. 
As discussed above, a large majority of these items are likely to 
be chemical inventions and formulas. Conversely, mechanical 
devices are unlikely to ever pass this first prong. A computer 
company’s source code (human-readable code in which software 
developers write programs) may also pass muster under this 
first prong, but would have great difficulty under the next. 
Next, the defendant must prove that the invention in 
question performs a valuable benefit to the health and 
  
 198 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2000).  
 199 The section requires certain conditions to exist in order to mandate 
licensing: (1) The patented invention is needed to achieve emission limitations; (2) No 
alternative methods are available; and (3) The patent reduces competition or 
monopolizes it. Id. 
 200 Gollin, supra note 172, at 223. 
 201 Id. at 234.  
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wellbeing of society. This will obviously be an area of strong 
contention. Exactly what is a “valuable benefit to the health 
and wellbeing of society,” and where should one draw the line? 
The goal here is to use the law as a tool to extract those 
inventions and formulas that are most beneficial to society 
while protecting those that have a more commercial purpose, 
such as a soft drink formula, or source code. It is difficult to 
formulate a rule that distinguishes between a product like a 
clean-burning alternative to gasoline and a soft-drink formula. 
On the one hand, it is necessary to balance industry’s interests 
in protecting its property rights in research and development; 
on the other, the health and wellbeing of society must be placed 
above the interest of industry. Hence, a balancing of these 
interests is necessary. The following are examples of inventions 
that should qualify under this analysis: 
1. The invention has the ability to save lives on a grand 
scale. 
2. The invention has the ability to protect the 
environment through directly or indirectly improving the 
quality of air, water, or other natural resources. 
3. The invention has the ability to improve vastly the 
quality of a human life (e.g., a cure for blindness, or a formula 
that prevents breast cancer). 
If the invention falls into one of the first three 
categories, one should next analyze the likelihood of the 
invention’s beneficial effect. If the beneficial effect upon society 
is highly likely, that invention should be deemed “beneficial to 
society.” 
Finally, the defendant would need to show that the 
owner of the trade secret was suppressing the idea or 
invention. One must avoid allowing the improper disclosure of 
a trade secret where the owner was merely suppressing the 
secret for an innocuous reason, such as to improve upon the 
new development. Examining factors such as the length of 
delay and changes in the original development would aid in 
this analysis. 
In sum, the three-element affirmative defense should 
aid in upholding the constitutionally mandated policy goal of 
“promot[ing] the Progress of Science and [the] useful Arts.”202 
By creating such a defense, trade secret owners would likely be 
  
 202 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also text accompanying notes 3, 72-79. 
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wary of suppressing knowledge that could benefit society 
because they would receive absolutely no remedy for its theft.  
Although the solution above does not altogether fix the 
problem of important discoveries being shielded from the 
public, it does filter out those socially beneficial inventions that 
could be shielded forever. It also helps to reduce an employee’s 
or scientific team’s risk of being prosecuted or sued for 
attempting to take their unused knowledge and useful 
inventions elsewhere. 
Admittedly, creating an affirmative defense may do 
little to encourage inventors to come forward when their ideas 
have been suppressed. One would have to be incredibly noble, 
or foolhardy, to risk imprisonment, civil sanctions, and 
litigation costs to ensure that their ideas found a way into the 
public domain. However, what we punish represents what we 
value as a society. Our laws define what we value as “good” in 
American life. Hence, creating an affirmative defense would 
also create an impetus as to what the law should be and, more 
broadly, what values society should encourage. 
B. Encouraging Cooperation to Avoid Collective Action 
Dilemmas 
The current trade secret scheme forbids cooperation 
among industry. The above discussion illustrates that this is an 
extremely poor way to encourage innovation, as new ideas 
build upon the ideas of others. To foster efficiency, the law 
should encourage cooperation to avoid the all too common 
problem illustrated in the prisoner’s dilemma—inefficient 
results caused by a lack of information.  
Legal scholars have recognized that these collective 
action problems can be solved through legal involvement. 
Indeed, a number of law and economic scholars at the 
University of Chicago argue that “[c]ollective action problems 
that fit the paradigm of the prisoner’s dilemma present a 
possible case for legal intervention.”203 These scholars are not 
alone; Professor Stearns uses game theory in arguing that the 
dormant Commerce Clause is in fact used as a judicial method 
to prevent states from enacting laws of mutual defection.204 
That is to say, free trade—collective action—is mutually 
  
 203 BAIRD ET AL., supra note 191, at 34.  
 204 Stearns, supra note 190, at 86-87. 
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beneficial to all states, but individual states would likely create 
laws discriminating against each other and benefiting their 
own local interests but for the watchful eye of the Supreme 
Court.205  
In In re Sutter-Butte By-Pass Assessment No. 6,206 the 
California Supreme Court was faced with a collective action 
problem involving the building of levees along areas subject to 
flooding. Individual landowners were likely to build levees in 
order to keep their land safe from floods; however, their action 
would threaten flooding elsewhere. The rational response of 
those across the stream would then be to build new and higher 
levees. This would have resulted in costs that were actually 
higher than if no levees were built at all.207 The court decided 
that “the only adequate method of preventing this result was 
the unification of the individualistic and antagonistic efforts . . 
. into one comprehensive coordinating plan looking toward the 
flood control of the river in its entirety.”208 Again, legal 
intervention created the optimum solution, thus reducing costs 
through avoiding a collective action problem. 
Indeed, collective action was even used to maximize the 
efficiency of research and development efforts aimed at 
combating intense air pollution in the Los Angeles area. In 
1988 the California legislature sought to drastically reduce the 
emissions of vehicles as quickly as possible.209 To accomplish 
this goal, the legislature sought cooperation among industry 
leaders in the field. Thus, the Auto/Oil Group was formed, 
consisting of three major auto manufacturers and fourteen 
major petroleum companies.210 The group signed the Auto/Oil 
Cooperative Agreement, where each pledged that the results of 
their research would be made public and that none of the 
  
 205 Id. at 87 (describing the per se rule against facially discriminatory laws). 
 206 191 Cal. 650, 655–56 (1923). 
 207 BAIRD ET AL., supra note 191, at 32. 
 208 191 Cal. 650, 656 (1923). 
 209 See Scott H. Segal, Fuel for Thought, Clean Gasoline and Dirty Patents, 51 
AM. UNIV. L. REV. 49, 55 (2001) (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018(a) 
(Deering 1995)). 
 210 See id. “The ‘Big Three’ U.S. automakers agreed to develop information on 
how to reduce vehicle emissions ‘through improved gasoline formulations, alternative 
fuels and advances in automobile technology . . . .” Id. at 55 n.51 (quoting UNOCAL, 
INC., AUTO/OIL STUDY PROVISIONS (2001), available at http://www.unocal.com/ 
rfgpatent/rfgao.htm (last visited April, 20, 2005)). 
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companies would claim proprietary interests.211 In order to 
achieve the optimum results, the Group enlisted elements of 
contract law to assure cooperation. 
A similar solution could prove beneficial in the law of 
trade secrets. Indeed, forcing cooperation as a system-wide 
remedy to trade secret research developments would be 
impossible to implement and equally impossible to regulate. 
Thus, a less hard-line approach is necessary. The common 
thread of the above examples is that they are all ad hoc 
collaborations necessitated by pressing problems common to a 
large group. 
As has been illustrated above, there are areas of 
research and development that are particularly prone to idea 
suppression—for example, areas involving chemical compounds 
that are extremely difficult to reverse engineer. Research 
developments involving chemical compounds that are made in 
areas such as Diabetes, Cancer, and Cardio-vascular disease 
(to name but a few) are undoubtedly “beneficial to society.” 
Indeed, “[t]here has been a dramatic increase in the attention 
and resources devoted to partnership or collaborative 
approaches to public health goals in the US.”212 Many nations213 
and states214 have formed united fronts and consortia to avoid 
duplicitous and wasteful medicinal research and encourage 
cooperation. 
Congress must be more in tune with the realities of 
research when creating broad legal constructs such as the 
EEA, and leave room for cooperative efforts such as these 
among industry. As a whole, we must be receptive to voices of 
change. We must avoid being the lukewarm supporters of 
change that Machiavelli described half a millennium ago. If our 
  
 211 Unfortunately one of the members of the group, Unocal, took out patents 
on certain technologies, which has caused much controversy. For an excellent 
discussion of this, see generally Segal, supra note 209. 
 212 Paula M. Lantz et al., Can Communities and Academia Work Together on 
Public Health Research? Evaluation Results from a Community-Based Participatory 
Research Partnership in Detroit, 78 J. URB. HEALTH: BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 495, 495 
(2001), available at http://www.futurehealth.ucsf.edu/pdf_files/Lantz.pdf (last visited 
April 6, 2005). 
 213 See, e.g., IRISH CANCER SOCIETY, at http://www.irishcancer.ie (last visited 
April 6, 2005); VICTORIAN BREAST CANCER RESEARCH CONSORTIM INC., at 
http://www.cancervic.org.au/cancer1/research/breastconsort.htm (last visited April 6, 
2005). 
 214 See, e.g., LOUISIANA CANCER RESEARCH CONSORTIUM, at http://www.lacrc 
.net (last visited Apr. 6, 2005); NORTHERN INDIANA RESEARCH CONSORTIUM, at 
http://www.nicrc.org (last visited Apr. 6, 2005). 
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legal framework is to foster efficiency for the benefit of society, 
we must not be incredulous or fearful of sharing information, 
especially in areas that stand to benefit the health and 
wellbeing of society. Although competition undoubtedly 
encourages innovation, in certain circumstances, so does 
cooperation.  
Admittedly, this solution falls short of the type of 
analysis necessary for properly forming a workable framework 
where trade secrets are shared at the most optimal of levels. 
The use of game theory, though, could aid economists in 
predicting what hypothetical companies are likely to do under 
various legal frameworks, and, thus, which frameworks would 
promote the greatest amount of innovation.215 Yet the purpose 
of this Note is not so much to propose an exact solution as it is 
to invite dialogue on this area of the law.  
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the forces Machiavelli described continue to 
shape our world of innovation. The current trend of 
protectionism has swung the pendulum too far in the direction 
of industry. In order to balance the scales there is a need for 
action. The proposed solutions advanced in this Note hope to 
encourage the sharing of ideas that truly benefit society most. 
By adding an affirmative defense that effectively strips away 
any trade secret rights an owner possesses, the law would be 
taking a step towards encouraging patenting and the limited 
monopoly that comes with it. By encouraging and seeking out 
ways to facilitate cooperation among industries that invent 
particularly beneficial products, the law would be encouraging 
a more optimal framework in which to operate. The two 
problematic areas that have been pointed out are not 
exhaustive, and the proposed solutions to those problems are 
by no means absolute. They are merely a starting point.  
The pendulum must swing back in the favor of society in 
order for trade secret law to serve the constitutionally 
mandated policy goals that intellectual property laws purport 
to serve. In order to understand best how the law of trade 
secrets frames the actions of industry and innovation, we must 
begin to analyze areas that have gone untested for years. We 
must work hard to strike a balance when history tells us those 
  
 215 See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 191, at 268. 
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in control will do whatever possible to remain there. Thus, I 
conclude with the hope that this Note encourages the reader to 
question the current trend of expanding protection in trade 
secrets and intellectual property as a whole. While I cannot 
provide a comprehensive solution to the complex problems 
discussed in this Note, questioning increased protection in this 
area of the law is nonetheless a good starting point. Indeed, the 
future of innovation depends on it. 
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